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1. INTRODUCTION 3
"Securing Asian Energy Investments:
Geopolitics and Implications for Business Strategy"
Conference Report
The Energy and Security Working Group of the Centerfor International Studies and the
MIT Japan Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
11-12 September 1997
I. Introduction
The strategic significance and rapidly growing economies of Asia make
the region one in which the vital relationship between energy and security is
magnified. In the early 1970's, Japan led the first East Asian economic "miracle,"
followed by a generation of Asian "tigers" the Republic of Korea, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan. A third generation of countries transformed by
economic growth in the late 1980's, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, was close
behind. Throughout this period of profound regional development, after the
reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China grew at double-digit rates. The future
of China's domestic and international politics as a result of its stunning economic
growth now looms as the key question in international affairs of Asia.
Economies are engines, and engines require fuel. Asia's spectacular
economic growth has led to the explosion of energy demand in the region. MIT
Professor Richard Samuels observed in the introduction to the conference that
Asia accounts for a quarter of global oil demand but holds only a tenth of its
supply. With the continued growth of the Chinese and other economies, Asian
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demand is expected to rise to 40 per cent of global energy demand by 2005. The
good news for investors and energy suppliers is that the Asian economies will
spend an estimated $1 trillion on energy infrastructure during the next decade.
In speculating where Asia's energy will come from, and how they might
secure it for their citizens, some analysts have considered some disturbing
political and economic implications.1 They suggest that China's burgeoning
demand could lead to higher world market oil prices. Some analysts also
wonder if the search for energy will lead Asian countries towards expansionism:
they single out China, until recently an exporter, now imports most of its oil.
How would states in the region react to acts of aggression? Will Asian
populations, increasingly reliant upon and accustomed to the energy that fuels
their economies and their lifestyles, may accept the bullying of weaker
neighbors? Would the United States be asked (or feel compelled) to intervene?
U.S. policy makers worry about bedfellows brought together by mutual needs:
they observe that China, in need of oil, has moved closer to Iran, with its desire
for nuclear technology, and to Russia as well. Is there a negative side to Asia's
explosive economic development? What are the potential security concerns
resulting from the region's search for energy?
In the conference "Securing Asian Energy Investments: Geopolitics and
Implications for Business Strategy," there emerged a discussion of Asian energy
and security issues in the realm of the known versus those unknown: what we
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know versus what we do not. Conference participants challenged folk theories
and conventional wisdom about energy and security in the region, and several
clear themes emerged.
II. Energy Knowns and Unknowns
A. What We Know
The facts on Asian energy start with the disparity between supply and the
extent to which demand is increasing. Professor Angang Hu of Tsinghau
University noted that although China is rich in coal and hydroelectric power, it is
poor in oil and natural gas reserves. Sustained economic growth (Hu forecasted
over seven percent growth rates being maintained even until 2020) will create
even greater demand for the resources that China lacks. Thus a major known
factor is the extent to which China and Asia as a whole will be looking for more
and more energy supplies. Professor Hu also noted that Chinese energy use is
less diversified (being singularly dependent on coal) than virtually every other
major state.




The CIA That Cried Wolf, and Other Stories
Despite the concerns expressed by some analysts and the press, however,
global oil supplies are rather secure. The oil crises of the 1970s created fear in
Western minds that their nations' economies and lifestyles were hostage to their
dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies. Various forecasts in that decade,
including one by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1977, predicted that the
world's oil reserves were reaching their peak, and that the world would be
drawing from wells that would soon run dry. Michael Lynch, Executive Director
of the MIT Energy and Security Working Group, pointed out that the world has
hundreds of years of oil resources: new fields in Latin America, the former
Soviet Union, the North Sea, Canada, and even increased production in the
United States. It seems that oil supply is not a long-term problem for the world
nor even for a "thirsty" Asia.
Lynch discussed the concept of a oil crisis by pointing out that it is not a
lack of oil, but a short-term disruption: an economic, not an energy problem. Oil
crises lead to higher prices and corporate losses that may weaken, but not stop,
economies. Other speakers, such as Guy Caruso of the International Energy
Agency, joined Lynch in noting the importance of crisis management by Asian
governments. As energy consumption rises, so does dependence and thus so
does vulnerability. Plans by governments to manage vulnerability not only
reassure economic actors within their countries, but reassure other countries that
6
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an energy-desperate nation will not look avariciously to its neighbors for fuel.
Crisis management of energy supplies, then, has implications for both economics
and security. Caruso noted China's interest in an oil stockpiling program,
pointing out that it is a positive sign precisely because of these reasons.
One energy "known," then, is that world oil resources are plentiful
enough to meet Asian demand. Unlike the studies that emerged following the
1970's crises, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the problem is not an
"empty tank" but of developing international policy approaches to access a tank
that is sufficiently full.
A Capital Idea
Another known quantity in Asian energy issues is the importance of
access to capital for building new power sources and for improving energy
efficiency in the region. Many of the speakers discussed the role of capital in
procuring new technology and how this would affect energy supplies and
efficiency.
MIT Professor Kenneth Oye noted how far most Chinese industries have
to go in terms of modernizing their outdated equipment; access to capital will
give companies the ability to finance the acquisition of new technologies. Much
of the needed technology currently exists, says Oye; acquiring it is a matter of
liberalizing capital markets and changing structural economic incentives. For
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example, technology for washing coal and then recycling the water currently
exists, but China does not have it yet. Moreover, although more of China's
industries are being managed according to commercial principles, Oye noted
that advances in management will go only so far. The contextual economic
incentives facing entrepreneurs will create an environment that either
encourages or discourages investment; the Chinese government is responsible
for economic reforms that encourage investment, and for capital market
liberalization that provides firms with the necessary funding. Changing
incentives to entrepreneurs and liberalizing capital markets to attract investors
will go far in promoting the transfer of technologies that China needs.
Oye observed that in addition to increasing efficiency, such liberalization
will benefit the environment, and China's relations with nearby countries as well.
A cleaner, more efficient use of coal will reduce the acid rain that China is
currently sending to its neighbors. MIT Professor Karen Polenske pointed out
that China is currently the second-largest contributor to greenhouse gas
emissions, or one-seventh of the global amount. She agreed with Oye: opening
up the Chinese economy to new capital will have a major environmental effect:
new equipment tends to be less polluting than the 30-40 year old technology on
which China currently relies.
Although the $1 trillion figure needed by Asia for investments in energy
sources seems formidable, conference participants agreed that the capital is
available, and that market liberalization and legal transparency rather than
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capital supply, are the key issues. Former Caltex Chief Economist Dennis
O'Brien noted that capital was plentiful and any good project would receive
funding. Agreeing, Caruso suggested that creating the proper environment to
attract foreign capital is more important than any capital shortage. He invoked
the example of Thailand's electricity industry, where the problem is finding good
projects and qualified people to run them.
Caruso observed that sale and privatization of public utility assets to
private investors was key for developing the Thai electricity industry, and that
independent power projects (IPP)s played a major role in increasing Thailand's
energy supplies. IPPs generate electricity for sale to utilities or to retail
customers. Also examining the role of IPPs, MIT doctoral candidate Peter Evans
looked at their role in supplying China. He noted that China increased its
electricity supply by 16,000 megawatts last year, and that overall, Asia invested
$9 billion in IPPs. At present, he said, most IPP projects are country specific. But
he added that once there is greater capital liberalization and regulatory
convergence among Asian countries, IPP projects will become more fully
multinational.
What emerged from the conference, then, was the consensus that capital
plays an essential role for the development of Asia's energy supplies. This
capital is plentiful and available, as is the technology needed by many Asian
countries. What disrupts the proper allocation of capital and the transfer of
needed technologies, then, are restraints on investment and political structures
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that create disincentives for technology acquisition. The promotion of capital
market liberalizations and economic reforms to encourage investment has many
benefits: in addition to economic efficiency, improved environmental conditions
that benefit not only single countries, but their neighbors as well. O'Brien
suggested that these sorts of smoothly functioning markets are the best
guarantee of security in the region.
B. Energy Unknowns
Although conference participants discussed many known quantities in the
issue-area of Asian energy, the influence of other factors remains very much
unknown to us at this time. These include future potential energy sources,
relative prices, and whether Asian nations will reconcile political and economic
issues between them so to take advantage of the benefits of cooperation.
Supplying the Future
The question of future energy sources was raised by several conference
participants. Tadahiko Ohashi of Tokyo Gas Company drew our attention to
candidates for future exporters of liquid natural gas (LNG): Australia, Papua
New Guinea, Alaska, Indonesia, and Russia, as well as non-Asian nations Oman
and Qatar. Tim Forsyth of the United Kingdom's Royal Institute of International
10
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Affairs discussed four key sources of gas and oil in Northeast Asia: East Siberia's
Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk regions, the Sakha Republic, the Sakhalin Islands, and
the far west of China such as the Tarim Basin, and neighboring countries like
Turkmenistan.
Forsyth and others noted that development of these regions was
anticipated to have great potential for meeting Asian energy demands, but that
the international cooperation required for development would require
surmounting political tensions between nations. Tadahiko Ohashi agreed that
development of a Russian pipeline to Northeast Asia was economically feasible,
but politically difficult. For example, Japanese dependence on imported energy,
and Japan's goal of finding stable sources of supply, fit in with Russia's need for
development capital and export markets for its oil and natural gas. Although a
lingering territorial dispute between the two nations, has made such cooperation
difficult, Katsuhiko Suetsugu of the Asia-Pacific Energy Forum noted that the
Japanese government has decided to decouple politics from economics,
facilitating Japanese participation in Russian energy projects. Guy Caruso cited
the example of electricity trade between Thailand and Malaysia to illustrate how
countries have much to gain by participating in new forms of international
energy trade. Peter Evans also suggested that convergence of regulatory policies
and practices among Asian nations will encourage the formation of multinational
enterprises that can result in economies of scale advantages for Asian nations,
which will enjoy cheaper access to energy.
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Tatsujiro Suzuki of CEPRI and Tokyo University addressed the very
difficult problems of nuclear power. Suzuki pointed out that Asia is the only
region in the world where nuclear power is expanding. Asian nuclear power
generation will double by 2010, and every state with a nuclear power program is
a declared or "threshold" nuclear weapons state. Suzuki added that both China
and the Republic of Korea have announced plans for reprocessing and breeder
reactor programs to close the nuclear fuel cycle. He added, moreover, that
nuclear waste management in Asia is insufficient. Japan, for example, is four
years away from exhausting its storage capacity. At present, only Japan has
complete fuel cycle capabilities including a 15-ton stockpile of plutonium that
has led many countries to be concerned about Japanese intentions to build
nuclear weapons. As it expands its civilian nuclear power program, Tokyo will
need to deal with the reactions of countries victimized by Japan in World War II,
which are not yet confident of Japanese pacifism.
Not Just a Bunch of Rocks
The Spratly Islands are another unknown quantity in Asia's source of
energy supply. New York University Professor David Denoon noted that while
these are trivial in size, the sea bed surrounding these atolls is believed to contain
significant natural gas (and possibly oil) reserves. Seven countries have claimed
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the territory: China, Taiwan, and ASEAN nations Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei,
the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Denoon noted that we are unlikely to discover just what supply prospects
the Spratlys have until the sovereignty issue is settled. Development will be
expensive, and no one will choose to carry it out until confident they may lay
claim to its benefits someday. Denoon proposed a model of "fair division," in
which the islands are divided into five zones and distributed among the
claimants, as one potential solution for the problem. Whether or not this (or any
other diplomatic initiative will solve the Spratly dispute is unknown at this time.
Similarly, the extent to which the energy reserves of the Spratlys can provide
energy for Asian nations is another unknown quantity.
The major unknown factors related to Asian energy, then, are twofold.
First, will countries be able to resolve pending international issues between them,
such that they can take advantage of energy. trading with their neighbors and
develop new sources of supply? Expanded reliance on nuclear energy by some
countries and access to new energy sources are contingent upon the ability of
Asian nations to resolve the political tensions that have been problematic in the
past. A second point concerns the need for liberalizing capital markets, changing
economic incentives, and allowing privatization. Will countries make these
necessary reforms, such that their domestic energy supply will be encouraged to
grow? The certain answer eludes us at this time, but conference speakers
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pointed to signs of progress in both the domestic and international realms that
should give us some grounds for optimism.
III. Security Knowns and Unknowns
Asian international security has become an issue of great interest since the
collapse of the bipolar Cold War system. The region is home to many powerful
countries and historical tensions, trade rivalries and territorial disputes. Japan is
the second-largest economy and military in the world, China is heading towards
great-power status and has an army of two million men, Russia may yet emerge
as a world power, and developing countries--particularly Indonesia with its
huge population--may also play a large role in the future of the region.
Energy is closely linked with security in not just Asia, but the entire
world. Economies run on energy, and countries with stronger economies are
able to field more formidable armed forces, and to supply them for longer
periods of time. Therefore armies are dependent on energy to fuel a strong
economic base, and more directly, to fuel the vehicles and ships that bring them
to battle. Moreover, energy security implies issues such as the need to secure
sources of supply, which may lead to shifts in international political alliances.
With large populations demanding oil to fuel their lifestyle, will Asian
populations allow governments to pursue coercion of weaker neighbors in the
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quest for energy? If so, Asia's growing demand for fuel could create regional
instability.
The conference addressed questions about energy-related security issues
in Asia. Some had clear answers, and others were difficult to answer at this
point. The next section examines such issues.
A. What We Know
The issues on which most conference participants agreed were the U.S.
role in Asia as a stabilizing force, the importance of domestic politics in shaping
Asian international security, China's still-nascent military capabilities, and the
undesirability of war in the region for all countries.
The Honest Broker
Many describe the role of the U.S. in Asia as an "honest broker," the
power most widely trusted in the region. First, the U.S. presence serves to
prevent Japan from dealing with the issue of acquiring a totally independent
military. Although Japanese armed forces are the best in the region next to those
of the U.S., they still lack air-to-air refueling, significant amphibious capabilities,
and other power projection capabilities that, if acquired, would alarm Japan's
neighbors. The continuation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty allows Japan to
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continue as it has, with about one per cent of its GDP devoted to defense
spending. This number would surely rise should the U.S. depart, and tensions
with Japan's neighbors (particularly Korea and China) would increase as well.
Therefore Chinese concern about U.S. containment and calls for the U.S. to leave
Asia have been muted by Beijing's recognition of the implications for Japanese
policy should the U.S. leave the region. Former Director of Central Intelligence
John Deutch pointed out that the U.S. is a trusted security provider in Asia and
should remain engaged in the region; a U.S. departure may unleash competition
between the other Asian powers. Such competition, in the form of arms races or
even armed conflicts, would disrupt the vital economies of the region and of the
world.
Domestic Politics Matter
Conference participants mentioned the significance of domestic politics in
a few key energy and security areas. Beijing's priorities, and their implications
for energy and security issues, were one area about which conference members
seemed confident. The government is recognized to prize political control above
all else; Professor Deutch pointed out that Beijing will always choose political
control over economics, and will always choose security over economics.
Although many noted the degree to which Beijing has abandoned communist
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policies for market reforms, most agreed that Beijing values maintained political
authority above all else.
This has both domestic and international implications for energy and
security. First, while uncertain how far along the road of economic liberalization
Beijing is willing to proceed, some optimism seems warranted. Thusfar, Beijing
has allowed privatization to the extent that it has been able to meet its energy
needs, for example, last year's acquisition of 16,000 megawatts of IPP-supplied
electricity as discussed by Peter Evans.
Second, the implications for international security look less promising.
China stands out in this regard because of its government's treatment of the
Spratly Island and other territorial issues. Calling these claims the "lost
territories," Beijing evokes China's "century of shame" when many of its
territories were seized by Western imperial powers. Professor Denoon pointed
out that by linking claims like the Spratlys to national pride, Beijing is
establishing a position that will make compromise with the other claimants
difficult. Chinese politicians may well reason that given their people's
perception that the islands are rightfully China's (a perception created by the
government's publicity about the issue), any compromise on their part will result
in public disapproval. Therefore domestic political considerations may cause
Beijing to take a hard line on the Spratly Island issue (similar arguments could be




Turn Down the Noise about the "China Threat"
Though the preceding conclusions seem to have dire implications for
international stability in Asia, conferees came to a different conclusion about the
extent to which other countries should be alarmed by growing Chinese power.
Although there are many uncertainties about Chinese power (to be discussed in
the next section), some optimistic assertions were made with confidence. MIT
doctoral candidates Christopher Twomey and Jacob Zimmerman showed that
dire warnings about China's huge military capability and Beijing's intentions
often overlook key facts. For example, of the 4,500 planes in China's air forces,
only 37 are the modern Sukhoi-27 Flanker; the vast majority are early-generation
planes that date back even to the 1950's. The Chinese air force is not able to
make trouble in Asia. Twomey and Zimmerman also indicated problems with
the Chinese navy related to inferior technology and that fact that China has a
long distance to go in training its personnel before some of their new naval assets
can be deployed. Since the technological advantage currently enjoyed by the
United States and its allies will continue for some time, assumptions about
relative Chinese military power should be examined more closely.
Speakers at the conference provided other grounds for optimism about
China. They reminded us that China benefits from cooperation with the West
and with its neighbors, and will suffer in the event of conflict. In order to meet
18
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its energy needs, China needs capital, and therefore allows market liberalization
to attract it, leading to greater energy efficiency and improved economic
efficiency. The improved environmental conditions and the increase of
international economic ties in turn are likely to improve China's relations with its
neighbors and with other countries involved in its development. Whether or not
such reforms will lead to a demand for democracy in China some day remains
unknown, but incremental economic reforms should improve Chinese relations
with other countries as well. Professor Samuels reminded us that these
assumptions about the peaceful consequences of economic interdependence
stand in contrast to the pessimism generated by a realpolitik approach to
economic development.
War, what is it good for?
After their discussion of the military capabilities of the powers of the
Asian region, speakers Twomey and Zimmerman noted that the countries of the
region have a strong interest in maintaining peace. Wars in the area would be
fought over water at long distances, and would be expensive. The costs of
disrupted commerce would be magnified by the extent to which the wealth of
these countries depends on exports. These countries have a strong interest in
solving their problems diplomatically. This of course is no guarantee that they
19
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will do so, but the fact that they have incentives to maintain peace is a positive
sign.
In summary, then, what we know about Asian security is clear. The U.S.
can play a mediating role in the region; its history there has established it as a
trusted diplomatic player. With Japan and Korea working closely with the U.S.
as a common ally, and with China spared the emergence of an independent
Japanese military, the continued involvement of the U.S. can contribute to
regional peace. Secondly, Chinese nationalism is related to energy and security
issues, as in the case of claims on the Spratly Islands. Chinese domestic politics
and the Spratly dispute, for example, are linked. Thirdly, as we think about the
potential for conflict in Asia, we should keep in mind there is less a "China
Threat" than the media presents. Chinese military capabilities are still nascent,
and the U.S. and its allies maintain an exceptional technological advantage.
Lastly we understand that underlying any discussion of Asian security issues
should be the recognition that all of the nations of the region enjoy great
advantages from sustained peace, and that a regional war would be
exceptionally costly.
Although we recognize the importance of these known factors, conference
participants raised questions about Asian security that are difficult to answer at




The several unknown factors about Asian security include what foreign
policies countries may apply in their search for energy, the future of the U.S. role
in the region, and whether or not institutions will emerge to facilitate
cooperation in both energy and security.
In Search of Energy
Conference participants agreed that domestic reforms promoting capital
availability would increase energy supplies for China and for other countries of
the region. One issue of concern is the question of states becoming expansionary
in their search for energy security. During the introduction Professor Samuels
posed the question: will dependence on foreign energy encourage Asian publics
to tolerate their (or other) governments' coercive behavior towards other
countries in the search for energy? One problem could be Chinese policy
towards the Spratlys, as evidenced in cases of Mischief Reef and various island
claims ranging from Natuna to the Diaoyutai. Other (far less likely) energy
flashpoints could include Japan and Russia, with their territorial dispute in the
Northern Islands, historical animosity, and military assets.
Competition for supply is unlikely to encourage significant military
expansion in Asia, but it may cause the shifting of alliances. In this regard
21
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Russia, China, and Japan are key players. Each can make choices that the United
States regards as inimical to international security of the region. One possibility
would be China seeking to secure oil access with closer ties with Middle Eastern
"rogue" states such as Iran. China, with its nuclear technology, may make the
decision that nuclear proliferation is acceptable given the energy access China
stands to gain. A choice in this direction will worsen the Sino-American
relationship. So would a warming of Russia and China or of Japan and Russia, if
it leads to a reluctance of Japan to cooperate with U.S. foreign policy in other
spheres. It seems that changes in alignments may create greater tensions
between the powers of the region than outright violation of sovereignty.
Stay or Go?
Although it is clear the United States has played a valuable security role in
the Asian region, it is not as clear how long this will continue. Professor Deutch
raised the issue of Korean unification; with North Korea increasingly weak,
unification could happen at any time over the next few years. When this
happens, and the North Korean threat no longer is an issue, the prime
justification for U.S. troops stationed in both Korea and Japan will disappear. At
that moment, there will be strong pressure in the United States and perhaps even
in Asia for a U.S. troop pullout.
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Institution Building
In the discussion of energy-related security issues in Asia, conference
participants noted the importance of multilateral cooperation for conflict
avoidance. Dr. Suzuki raised the example of the 60,000 drums of low level waste
that North Korea agreed to store for Taiwan. This agreement was conducted
bilaterally and led to protests by many Asian nations; given the lack of
transparency in the deal, no one can be sure what the waste includes and what
North Korea may receive from it. Suzuki advocated the formation of a
multilateral Asian nuclear energy institution to oversee such arrangements; the
greater transparency it would create would help allay many countries' fears
about the implications of greater reliance upon nuclear power.
MIT's Lynch, in pointing out the importance of crisis management plans
for stable oil supplies, reminded the audience that greater multilateralism can
help allay fears about oil supplies as well. National guidelines for oil stockpiling,
and monitoring by an international institution, may reassure Asian countries that
their neighbors have responsible plans for oil crisis management, and may stem
fears that an oil-desperate country will to coerce its neighbor in its search for
fuel. Japan, with 98% of its fuel supply dependent upon oil imports, already has
a large stockpile, and China has expressed interest in developing such a
program. Multilateral institutions that address such concerns may reassure
23
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Asian nations that energy security need not be a potential cause of expansionism
or other instability in the region.
Thus conference participants observed that there are many unknown
quantities in Asian security. In their search for energy, countries may choose
expansionism or alignments that are detrimental to U.S. interests in the region, or
to relations with their neighbors. Although the U.S. seems to have been a
stabilizing force in Asia, we are uncertain how this may continue given the end
of the justification provided by the North Korean threat. A U.S. role can be
maintained through influence in international institutions, which may emerge to
help alleviate tensions caused by the search for increased energy supplies.
It should be noted at this point that many more security "flashpoints"
exist in the region, but that these are less related to the quest for energy. The
standoff between the two Koreas has persisted since the end of the Korean war,
and a second war on the peninsula is regarded as the most worrisome potential
flashpoint. Taiwan is another potentially explosive flashpoint, but is related
more to domestic Chinese politics than to energy issues. The U.S. decision to
participate in a Taiwan crisis will be more about its global role than about energy
issues. Other issues of concern in Asia, such as island disputes between Japan
and Korea (Tokdo/Takeshima) and Japan and China (Senkaku/Diaoyutai) are
similarly related more closely to national sovereignty than to energy. These
issues are other question marks that characterize the uncertain future of Asian
international security.
24
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IV. Conclusion
In the conference "Security Asian Energy Investments: Geopolitics and
Implications for Business Strategy," many common themes emerged about what
we know and do not know about Asian energy and security issues. The rapidly
growing Asian economies, China in particular, will continue increasing its
demand for energy, and this demand will need to be met. The search for energy
supplies is acknowledged to have domestic and international implications.
Domestically it requires the ability of states to attract capital, which is
acknowledged to be plentiful and available. Attracting capital will require
market liberalization, which has implications for central political control. The
case of China has been, and will continue to be, the most interesting to observe in
this regard. Domestic politics in China are recognized as crucial in
understanding all aspects of Chinese government policy, be its Spratly Island
claims or its regulation of domestic capital markets.
The search for energy has international implications as well. Showing that
world oil supply is plentiful, conference participants debunked the conventional
wisdom that states will necessarily compete for oil in a world of scarce resources.
Speculation continues, however, about how states will compete for access to the
oil and other energy that does exist. We are uncertain if some Asian nations may
choose expansionism or alliance behavior that could create instability in the
25
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region. We are uncertain that the U.S. role in the region will continue. We are
uncertain that international institutions, which could make states more secure in
the search for energy supplies, will be created.
We know, however, that countries about whose intentions there has been
a great deal of speculation--notably China--do not yet present a military threat
to the United States or its allies in Asia. Moreover, China and others have strong
incentives to avoid conflict. An Asian war would be expensive and economically
devastating for the countries involved, and would disrupt the international
economy as well because of the region's significance.
China has a great deal to benefit from continued economic ties with the
U.S., Europe, and its own neighbors. Conference speakers highlighted how
outdated technology in China requires modernization, which would increase
economic efficiency as well as improve environmental conditions. China's
inefficient coal shipping network can be transformed with western expertise and
capital, increasing China's energy supply. Therefore not only is its military
unable to challenge the west, China will find many economic reasons why
conflict would damage itself as much as any other party. The case of China is
one in which a close examination of what we know is essential for dealing with
the uncertainties that confront us. Continued exploration of energy and security
issues facing China and Asia as a whole will help lessen uncertainty surrounding
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